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THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT’S STRUGGLE TO REMAIN RELEVANT
Chris Cobleigh
University of Rhode Island

“Organized labor. Say those words and your
heart sinks.” So begins Thomas Geoghegan’s
account of his experience as a labor lawyer in an
era when organized labor is in decline.
Geoghegan portrays labor’s struggle to regain a
prominent place in American society as a noble
cause, one worth fighting for, but sees the window
of opportunity closing. Indeed, he predicts, “One
day I will wake up and the unions will be gone,
completely gone…I look in my open grave and see
a future of workmen’s comp. I see old skulls, old
bones of workers” (Geoghegan 1992: 1). The
state of organized labor in America clearly gives
Geoghegan reason to worry. When his book was
published in 1992, the percentage of eligible
workers represented by unions had dropped
precipitously from a peak of 32.5 percent in 1953
to approximately 16 percent. That figure was
down from 20-25 percent in 1982, and as
Geoghegan surveyed the future, he lamented,
“Maybe it will drop to 12. Once it drops to 10, it
might as well keep dropping to zero” (Geoghegan
1992: 1). In the intervening 12 years, the overall
percentage of unionized employees has dropped to
13.5 percent, and in the private sector, the
percentage has shrunk to 9 percent. (Wheeler
2002: xiii).
What has caused such a monumental decline?
There is widespread agreement that the causes
have been both external and internal. Externally,
there has been a fundamental shift in the American
economy from manufacturing to service-based
jobs. Since labor has heretofore achieved its most
significant gains by organizing production
workers, it appears to be having difficulty
transitioning to large-scale, service sector
organization. Globalization has made capital more
mobile, thus allowing employers to transfer high
wage American jobs to countries with lower wage
rates and fewer government regulations. The
political environment has increasingly favored
capital, so that labor laws originally designed to
protect labor against the excesses of capital have
been gradually amended to impede the right of
workers to organize and engage in collective

bargaining. Consequently, some workers believe
they stand a better chance of achieving gains in the
workplace by means of individual negotiation with
their employers rather than collective bargaining.
It is argued that this is because workers have lost
confidence in the ability of unions to secure
workplace gains and/ or because employers have
made efforts to accommodate workers’ needs in an
effort to avoid unionization. (Yates 1998: 135137).
The internal causes of labor’s decline are said
to relate primarily to its willingness to enter into a
cooperative relationship with capital in the years
following World War II. In an effort to establish
labor peace during that period, corporate leaders
agreed to recognize the legitimacy of labor and
bargain in good faith over key issues such as
wages and hours. For its part, labor agreed not to
interfere with management prerogatives, thus
giving it relative autonomy in day-to-day business
operations, and to refrain from striking during the
life of the collective bargaining agreement. This
so called “corporate agenda” enabled unions to
achieve substantial gains for their members in
terms of core issues such as wages, hours, and
fringe benefits, but it forced them to abandon the
wider mission which had been the root of their
success in the first place. Instead of continuing to
push for widespread social reforms that would
strengthen the rights of all workers, unions
focused on servicing their own members’ interests.
This led them to abandon their efforts to organize
new members and created union bureaucracies
dedicated to maintaining the status quo. The
leaders of these bureaucracies became politically
powerful and began to distrust those within the
labor movement who sought to disrupt the balance
of power established between labor, management,
and government. Labor was no longer sure it
wanted an active rank and file advocating strikes
and other forms of direct action.
Whereas
economic action had been a key component of
labor’s success during the first half of the
twentieth century, such ideas were suddenly seen
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as too radical and potentially harmful to the gains
labor had won for its members.
For nearly a quarter century following World
War II, the compromise between labor and
management produced positive economic results.
The higher wages gained by workers produced a
burgeoning middle class, and the resulting
increase in economic consumption lead to a
corresponding increase in production. When the
post-war economic boom ended (as a result of
overproduction
and
increasing
global
competition), capital began to look for a way to
offset falling profits. It attempted to cut the wages
and benefits it had freely given workers as part of
the so called “labor-management accord” and
initiated campaigns to impede new unionization
efforts and destroy existing unions. Having
developed cumbersome bureaucracies fully
committed to “service unionism”, labor was illequipped to respond to capital’s retreat from the
accord. Its ineffectiveness in opposing capital’s
anti-union campaigns eventually lead workers to
believe they might be better off negotiating with
their employers individually. Thus, it is suggested
that the shift in labor’s internal organization from
being an engine for social change to being an antidemocratic bureaucracy has been a key factor in
its decline (Yates: p.135-143).
In light of these developments, there has been
widespread debate concerning the future of
organized labor in America. Like Geoghegan,
many are resigned to labor’s extinction. Labor
scholars have begun to ascribe to the theory long
espoused by the business community that the rise
of organized labor was a necessary response to the
excesses of the industrial age, that it was highly
successful in establishing basic workplace rights
and raising the standard of living for millions of
working class Americans, but that it has become
obsolete in an era where individualism and a
global economy rule the day. Others assert that
labor has historically experienced periods of
decline but has always been able to revive itself
when economic conditions force workers to
consider the merits of collective action. The
optimists argue that as long as the employeremployee relationship exists, employees will be
compelled to keep their employers in check
through some form of collective action; they will
never abandon unionism entirely because the
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alternative would be complete employer
dominance. Which of these views is correct?
Have unions in America become obsolete? Have
they lost their ability to represent workers’
interests in a meaningful way in the current
political and economic environment? What, if
anything, can they do to return workers’ rights to
the forefront of the American political and social
agenda? These questions are the focus of this
paper.
In determining whether organized labor is
capable of adequately representing workers’
interests, it will first be useful to try to define
those interests, both from labor’s perspective and
from the perspective of workers themselves. In a
1994 report entitled, “The New American
Workplace: A Labor Perspective”, the Executive
Council of the AFL-CIO presented its view of
workers’ priorities and the role of organized labor
in facilitating those priorities:
“The moment has come for unions to insist
upon the right of workers to anticipate in shaping
the work system under which they labor and to
participate in the decisions that affect their
working lives. Unions have an equally important
role to play in assuring that workplace change
plants strong roots. Unions provide a check on
managers and owners who waver in their
commitment to the new work order or who seek to
revert to old ways” (AFL-CIO 1994: 14).
Clearly, then, the AFL-CIO argues that
workers want a greater voice in determining the
terms and conditions of their employment. It
further asserts that unions have a vital role to play
in checking or limiting capital’s ability to
maximize profit at the expense of workers. In a
recent interview, AFL-CIO president John
Sweeney provided a more detailed explanation of
labor’s goals for the future, identifying several key
areas of concern and laying out strategies to deal
with them. Concerning the effect of globalization
on American workers, Sweeney explained:

“The essence of our fight is to promote the
Declaration of Fundamental Principles on
Rights at Work, the International Labor
Organization standards that include the rights
to collective bargaining, not to be
discriminated against in employment, to reject
child labor, and to refuse forced labor. Our
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aim is not to impose our standards on other
countries, but to make sure that human beings
are treated as having rights, and have the
opportunity to join unions if they desire to”
(Wheeler 2002: 218).
Commenting on the AFL’s political goals,
Sweeney noted that labor has helped Democrats
gains seats in Congress in every election from
1996 to 2000 and predicted that increasing
political activism on the part of union members
would bolster labor’s efforts to achieve electoral
victories in the future (Wheeler 2002: 217). At an
AFL-CIO labor lawyers conference in April of
2004, Sweeney once again stressed the need to
mobilize union support for Democratic candidates
and get out the vote on election day. He presented
a ten-point strategy for achieving these goals,
including: 1. Recruiting key contacts at local and
worksites, 2. Distributing leaflets at all union
worksites, 3. Maximizing contact through union
publications, 4. Mailing frequent communications
from local union presidents and other leaders, 5.
Updating local member lists, 6. Increasing voter
registration by 10 percent, 7. Conducting a
massive get-out-the-vote effort, 8. Building rapid
response networks in the workplace, and 10.
Linking politics to organizing. (AFL-CIO 2004: 15).
Finally, Sweeney alluded to what has clearly
been the centerpiece of his reform agenda since he
assumed the presidency in 1995: the need to move
away from the “service and bargaining model”
(wherein unions focus primarily on servicing the
needs of their members through the collective
bargaining process) and toward an intensive effort
to organize new members. He noted that if the
AFL-CIO could achieve its goal of organizing 1
million new members annually, it would be able to
“hold its own as a percentage of the workforce.”
He then noted that it was currently close to
organizing about half that number, or 500,000 new
members annually (Wheeler 2002: 218).
Sweeney’s comments on labor’s objectives are
significant because they reveal what could be
viewed as a relatively conservative reform agenda.
Certainly, Sweeney is not advocating a radical
departure from the way labor does business or a
full-scale revolt against corporate America in
response to decades of union-busting, wage and
benefit cuts, plant closings, and the more recent
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phenomena of job relocation and outsourcing.
Given labor’s seemingly limited objectives, it may
be reasonable to assume that at least some of
Sweeney’s goals are attainable in the near future.
For example, it is not hard to imagine imminent
success in the political arena. The American
economy has experienced a recession in the last
three years accompanied by significant job loss,
and although recent economic indicators suggest
that a recovery is in the offing, job creation
continues to lag behind. The other key issue in the
current election season is the ongoing war on
terror and the occupation of Iraq. Given the
American public’s mixed feelings about these
issues, a political shift is possible.
Where
Republicans have managed to hold onto their
political power base since the landmark election of
1994, it is conceivable that labor’s electoral efforts
will pay dividends in November 2004.
It is also reasonable to envision a scenario in
which the AFL’s efforts to bring the Declaration
of Fundamental Principles on Rights at Work to
the attention of employers around the world are
successful. Many nations throughout the world
currently recognize and abide by the five
principles enunciated in the Declaration, and
because labor’s stated goal is simply to increase
awareness of the Declaration (rather than trying to
enforce it), the goal may be reachable.
The AFL’s success in meeting its organizing
goals is less certain. In order to effectively
organize 1 million new members annually, labor
will have to overcome several longstanding
problems. It will have to wage a successful public
relations battle to dispel the notion that American
unions are too bureaucratic and corrupt, that they
are, in effect, just another corporation whose
leaders seek to benefit themselves at the expense
of their members. Further, it will have to convince
workers that it can be a more effective vehicle for
promoting workers rights and achieving gains in
the workplace.
Even assuming that labor can achieve these
goals, the next question becomes whether they are
consistent with the needs and desires of workers.
What do American workers want, as defined by
the workers themselves? An extensive survey of
worker preferences published in 1998 reveals that
workers want a system of labor-management
relations somewhat different from the one that
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now exists. First, they want a greater ability to
participate in decisions that affect their lives at
work; they believe that such participation will
make them happier as individuals and make the
organization for which they work for more
productive and profitable. They believe that
worker participation should take several different
forms. On some issues, such as sexual harassment
and general workplace grievances, they prefer
dealing with their employers individually rather
than as a group of employees. On issues such as
wages, benefits, and health and safety in the
workplace, they show a preference for collective
action. Though about one third of workers believe
their employers are unsympathetic to their needs
in the workplace and strongly resist sharing power,
they nevertheless seek a cooperative relationship
with their employers.
They believe that
developing an openly hostile labor-management
relationship is counterproductive for them as
individuals and for the enterprise as a whole.
They further believe that any kind of workplace
organization will be more successful if it enjoys
management participation and support. While
some express a preference for unionization, others
prefer some form of labor-management committee
in which workers and managers make joint
decisions regarding workplace rules and
procedures.
Included in such a committee
structure would be a mechanism for resolving
workplace
disputes
through
independent
arbitration rather than management discretion.
Furthermore, they believe such a committee
system would better allow them to achieve gains
in the workplace than additional government
regulation. Essentially, then, workers want a
varied system of participation and representation
with a more cooperative and equal relationship to
management, but a majority appear to want it
without government interference or a union. In
other words, they believe they can get what they
want from their employers without significant help
from external forces (Freeman and Rogers 1999:
4-8).
These statistics appear to validate the view
held by some commentators that organized labor
has become obsolete. Pointing to the fact that
roughly two thirds of all non-union employees
would choose not to vote for a union, and citing
the statistics regarding the desire for less external
interference, they argue that American workers
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have fully embraced the notion of individualism in
the workplace. They assert that the conditions
which contributed to the meteoric rise of unions in
the 1930s and 40s have vanished, never to return,
because workers have more individual bargaining
power than they did half a century ago and
employers have learned how to deal with their
employees in ways that makes unions unnecessary
(Wheeler 2002: 5). However, the data collected
by Freeman and Rogers also clearly shows that
workers do not feel they have an adequate voice at
work, do not have faith in management’s
willingness to share decision-making power, and
support changing the system by which workplace
decisions are made. Those statistics support the
view that unions are unlikely to become totally
extinct. Indeed, many labor analysts suggest that
“as long as people procure their livelihood by
working for wages and salaries, they will
recognize, sooner or later, the futility of appealing
to their employers as individuals” (Aronowitz
1998: 7).
The data indicates that 90 percent of current
union members are confident in and satisfied with
their union. The data further indicates that one
third of non-union members see the formation of
the union as a viable option and would vote in
favor of one (Freeman and Rogers 1999: 69). An
additional 12 percent of those who would vote
against the union cite management opposition as
their reason for doing so. Absent such opposition,
they said they would change their position and
vote in favor of the union (Freeman and Rogers
1999: 87). Combining these numbers, Freeman
and Rogers estimate that approximately 44 percent
of all private sector workers would like to be
represented by a union (Freeman and Rogers
1999: 89). And as Aronowitz points out, at least a
portion of those who currently believe they can get
what they want from their employers by
negotiating with them individually are bound to be
disappointed when they discover their employer’s
intransigence. Add to that the fact that not all
employers will agree to establish labormanagement committees featuring joint decisionmaking on key workplace issues, and the
inevitable conclusion is that at least some portion
of the American workforce will see the need to
organize a union in an attempt to force the
employer to recognize certain basic worker rights.
If nothing else, the idea that union contracts
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require the employer to show just cause before it
fires someone is sufficient reason for workers to
favor unionization. Thus, it appears unlikely that
the basic concept of unionization in accordance
with the rules set forth in the National Labor
Relations Act will vanish entirely from the
American workplace.
However, the larger
question is whether labor is capable of achieving
its stated goal of helping workers participate in the
decisions that affect their working lives and
provide a check on capital when it oversteps its
bounds. I argue that to meet these objectives,
labor must achieve greater parity with capital;
however, that will be impossible to do in the
absence of a dramatic economic collapse similar to
the Great Depression. The fundamental principles
of capitalism are too firmly embedded in the
American consciousness. The American people
will only question the validity of the capitalist
ideal if it completely collapses. Therefore, absent
some sort of cataclysmic economic event, labor
will most likely be relegated to its familiar role of
an anti-establishment organization which will have
only a marginal effect on the operation of
capitalist principles. Perhaps the most effective
way to support this theory is to undertake a brief
examination of the history of the American labor
movement.
Beginning in the latter half of the 19th century,
several influential labor unions competed with
each other for the allegiance of the nation’s
working class and, in so doing, defined the limits
of American unionism. In the 1880s, The Knights
of Labor rose in response to the infusion of
unskilled and semi-skilled workers into a newly
industrialized workforce.
Rapidly expanding
markets caused employers to engage in cutthroat
competition characterized by lower prices and,
consequently, lower wages.
This downward
pressure on wages lead unskilled and semi-skilled
workers, many of whom were newly arrived
immigrants, to demand a labor organization which
would address the growing imbalance between
labor and capital. The Knights of Labor took up
their cause. During the same period, the American
Federation of Labor focused exclusively on
organizing skilled workers, who had been
intermittently successful in gaining wage and hour
concessions from their employers but were not
organized under a single umbrella. The AFL
sought was to harness the power of skilled workers
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to affect significant change in wages, hours and
terms of employment, but believed that any
attempt to include the growing class of unskilled
and semi-skilled workers would detract from this
goal.
The demise of the Knights of Labor stemmed
primarily from the fact that their goals were too
broad and unfocused to wage an effective battle
against capital. They sought to educate their
workers on economics and politics so they would
be prepared to lead society, and their ultimate goal
was the formation of worker cooperatives in which
workers would share ownership of the means of
production. The Knights believed that without
worker cooperatives, organized labor would not be
able to successfully achieve its goals because it
would forever be in opposition to the most
powerful force in American society: capital
(Wheeler 2002: 98). The Knights ultimately failed
because they could not make the idea of worker
cooperatives a reality. Attempting to organize and
educate unskilled, semi-skilled, and skilled
workers was a monumental task. The AFL
presented a better alternative for skilled workers
because they had more bargaining power which
with they could force employers to grant
concessions. And the Knights lack of focus and
organization made them an easy target for
employer attacks. Indeed, one of the key factors
contributing to their decline was the media’s
portrayal of the Knights as the primary cause of
the Haymarket Riot of 1886, in which several
Chicago police officers were killed. Though it
was later discovered that the riot was lead by a
group of anarchists who had no affiliation with the
Knights, the press targeted them as the
perpetrators and succeeded in turning public
opinion against them. Ultimately, the Knights’
idea of comprehensive social change was defeated
by forces which favored the proliferation of
capitalism. Conversely, the AFL continued to
grow during this period because they sought to
work within the capitalist system to achieve gains
for skilled workers.
The competition between the Knights and the
AFL provided an early indication of the extent to
which labor could affect change in its relations
with capital. However, it was the historic political
shift that occurred in the aftermath of the Great
Depression that truly defined the limits of labor’s
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influence. When Franklin Roosevelt was elected
to the presidency in 1932, he promised a
revolutionary economic and political agenda that
would lift American out of the Depression. As
part of this agenda, he openly challenged big
business and sought to replace laissez-faire
economics with a system of government regulation
that would put a floor on prices and wages and a
ceiling on hours. Upon signing the National
Industrial Recovery Act, Roosevelt proclaimed,
“No business which depends for existence on
paying less than living wages to its workers has
any right to continue in this country.”
(Lichtenstein 2002: 25). In 1935, Congress passed
the National Labor Relations Act, which gave
workers the right to “form, join or assist labor
organizations, bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and engage
in concerted activity for (their)…mutual aid or
protection.” It enforced those rights by requiring
employers to bargain collectively with their
employees and proscribing employer unfair labor
practices (Hardin 1992: 28). The following year,
during his 1936 re-election campaign, Roosevelt
continued his assault on corporate America:
“Organized money are unanimous in their hatred
for me, and I welcome their hatred. The forces of
selfishness and of lust for power have met their
match” (Lichtenstein 2002: 46). Such rhetoric
emboldened organized labor not just to push for
the usual improvements in wages and hours, but to
think in terms of much larger social change in
which “the responsibilities and expectations of
American citizenship-due process, free speech, the
right of assembly and petition-would now find
their place in the factory, the mill, and the office”
(Licthenstein 2002: 32). Surveying the newly
formed political landscape, CIO president John L.
Lewis confidently challenged capital: “Let him
who will, be he economic tyrant or sordid
mercenary, put his strength against this mighty
upsurge of human sentiment now being
crystallized in the hearts of thirty million workers
who clamor for the establishment of industrial
democracy and for participation in its tangible
fruits” (Lichtenstein 2002: 32).
In 1937, the newly formed United Auto
Workers seized upon the momentum created by
the New Deal and Roosevelt’s re-election to stage
a “sit-down” strike at the General Motors
Corporation in Flint, Michigan. At the time, GM
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was the largest and most profitable corporation in
America, with 110 manufacturing plants
nationwide, a quarter of a million employees, and
half a million stockholders. It was, in short, “the
perfect exemplar of how and why American
business (was) big” (Lichtenstein 2002: 48). By
physically occupying more than a dozen GM
plants across the nation over a six-week period,
the strikers were successful in halting production
and inflicting significant financial damage on the
corporate giant.
Eventually, GM reached a
settlement with the UAW in which it agreed to
recognize the union as the exclusive bargaining
representative of its employees and negotiate on a
multiplant basis. More significantly, workers
gained the right to complain to management about
arbitrary supervision and onerous work rules
without fear of retribution. The phenomenal
success of the GM strike created sense of
optimism and self-confidence among workers
nationwide, and union membership swelled. From
1933 to 1937, American unions recruited 5 million
new members, 3 million of which joined in the
several months following the GM strike
(Lichtenstein 2002: 51).
Despite the tremendous momentum of the
labor movement during this period, its growth was
hampered by internal divisions and the retaliatory
actions undertaken by capital. The Congress of
Industrial Organizations had taken up the cause of
unskilled and semi-skilled workers in the
aftermath of the Knights of Labor and aligned
itself closely with the Roosevelt administration.
The AFL opposed the CIO’s brand of unionism
because it believed labor should remain
independent from government. It objected to the
NLRA’s intrusion into labor-management
relations because it did not believe government
should have the right to determine the appropriate
size and makeup of a union’s bargaining unit or
mandate elections to determine the will of workers
in that unit (Lichtenstein 2002: 65). As a result,
the AFL initially denounced the NLRA as “left
wing” and actually aligned itself with conservative
politicians and businessmen in an effort to revise
the Act. The AFL also bought into the aggressive
anti-Communist sentiments of these conservative
groups, and together they began to attack the CIO
for including radical communist elements within
its ranks.
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Corporate America was understandably
alarmed by the success of the labor movement and
sought to neutralize its gains at every turn. Alfred
Sloan, president of GM, characterized capital’s
view of the labor insurgency, saying, “It took 14
years to rid this country of prohibition. It is going
to take a good while to rid the country of the New
Deal, but sooner or later the ax will fall and we’ll
get a change.” The change came in the form of
Republican majorities in both houses of Congress
in 1946, followed by the passage of the TaftHartley Act in 1947. By banning secondary
boycotts, establishing the right of workers not to
join unions (which lead to the enactment of rightto-work laws and the elimination of closed shop
and union shop agreements), overturning the
Norris-Laguardia Act (which restored the courts’
authority to issue injunctions to enjoin certain
types of union activity), and establishing
procedures through which employers could
decertify unions which had previously won an
election, Taft-Hartley was a welcome first step in
capital’s drive to re-assert its dominance over
labor. The fact that labor ultimately failed to
maintain its position of power despite the
overwhelming economic and political advantages
it derived from the Great Depression and the New
Deal indicates that its chances for revival in the
current environment are slim.
In addition to the weight of historical trends,
there appear to be inconsistencies between the
traditional structure and function of American
unions and the workplace organization currently
preferred by many workers. Though labor has
correctly identified the primary complaint of most
workers (lack of the ability to participate in the
decisions that affect their working lives), the
preference of many workers to be able to negotiate
individually on some issues and collectively on
others with minimal interference from external
groups such as government and unions creates an
obvious conflict. Many workers simply do not see
the need for a union as long as they believe some
alternate form of collective action is possible. If
workers believe they can come together informally
to negotiate with management on certain key
issues, the alternative of formally establishing a
union through the NLRB, creating a perpetually
adversarial relationship with their employers, and
paying dues to support a collective bargaining
process in which they have little or no
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involvement is less appealing. Indeed, workers
who are skeptical about union representation
believe, in varying percentages, that collective
representation is often inferior to handling
workplace problems on their own, that having a
union creates too much tension in the company,
which they don’t like the way unions operate, and
that unions are too weak to help workers (Freeman
and Rogers 1999: 86). As noted earlier, because
management is bound to resist the idea of ad hoc
collective bargaining or labor-management
committees in which decisions are made jointly by
workers and managers, traditional unionism will
remain an option for some workers, but its
incompatibility with many workers’ ideal
workplace organizational structure may make it a
second alternative rather than a preference.
Turning to the goals themselves, it appears
that labor’s relatively conservative reform agenda
may be inadequate to address the needs and
desires of American workers in the current
economic environment. Though labor’s list of
initiatives to protect and strengthen worker’s rights
is extensive, it may be useful to consider the three
major goals mentioned by AFL-CIO president
John Sweeney in his June 2001 interview. Since it
formed an alliance with the Democratic Party
during the Roosevelt Administration, a primary
goal of labor has been to elect Democrats to state
and local legislatures as well as Congress and the
White House. This has been a particularly urgent
priority since the onset of labor’s decline in the
early 1970s because labor has blamed the decline,
in large part, on the glaring deficiencies in
American labor law. As such, labor believes legal
reform is the key to turning the tide against antiunion employers and reviving the movement. A
brief overview of the NLRA and the procedures
through which it governs labor-management
relations will be instructive in understanding
labor’s complaints about the current state of the
law.
In 1935, a progressive Congress passed the
National Labor Relations Act to enable workers to
organize and assert their rights against dominant
employers. A decade later, a more conservative
legislature sought to neutralize the effects of the
NLRA with the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act.
Since then, labor has discovered that the
framework established by these two bills puts
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workers at a distinct disadvantage in organizing
workers and resisting management’s efforts to
divide and conquer them.
The difficulties begin before an election is
ever held.
Union organizers will first ask
employees to sign authorization cards showing
their support for the union. If less than a majority
of employees agree to sign, the union must
petition the National Labor Relations Board for an
election to determine whether the union will be
certified as the employees’ official representative
for collective bargaining purposes. If a majority
sign cards, the employer has the option of
accepting the union as the employees’ official
representative without a certification election.
However, it may also decline to accept the cards as
proof of employee support and may ask for an
election.
Employers routinely refuse to
acknowledge union authorization cards, even if
100 percent of the employees sign, because they
are able to delay union certification by contesting
the legitimacy of employee support for the union
(AFL-CIO 2004: Employee Free Choice Act). It
may further delay the election by challenging the
appropriateness of the bargaining unit. The longer
the employer is able to delay the election, the more
time it has to convince workers that they are better
off without the union. In making its case, the
employer is permitted to disseminate anti-union
information suggesting that bad things will happen
if the union is elected. It may hold captive
audience meetings in which the negative aspects
of unionism are highlighted while simultaneously
prohibiting union organizers from entering the
premises for the purpose of presenting pro-union
information. It may not legally threaten workers
with dismissal or fire them for supporting a union
drive, but the Board imposes no penalty for such
illegal actions. A worker who is threatened or
fired for union activity will eventually be
reinstated, but determining whether the employer
has acted illegally may take months or years. In
the meantime, the worker is without a job. (Yates
1998: 137). If the employee decides to return to
his job following reinstatement, he may be
punished by the employer for bringing his
complaints to the Board in the first place and may
eventually be fired again for his union activity,
though the employer’s official explanation will be
that he was fired for something else. Essentially,
then, the employer has a host of options at its
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disposal, both legal and illegal, to hinder the
election process before a single vote is cast. The
mere fact that the employer can significantly
disrupt the process before it has begun may
convince some workers that organizing will be
more trouble than it’s worth.
If the union somehow avoids all these
obstacles and is successful in holding and winning
an election, the employer may then hinder the
collective bargaining process by refusing to
engage in constructive contract negotiations. An
employer’s outright refusal to bargain with the
union constitutes an unfair labor practice, but it is
free to be as obstinate as possible during
negotiations to ensure that no agreement is
reached on subjects that may be essential to the
formation of the contract. By engaging in these
tactics, particularly while negotiating the first
contract between the two sides, the employer may
be successful in destroying the employees’
confidence in the newly elected union’s ability to
operate effectively for its members. If member
support begins to erode, the employer may call for
a decertification election. If, after all this, the
employer is unsuccessful in breaking the union, it
has the option of punishing or firing union
supporters. Again, while such tactics clearly
contravene the NLRA, employees must wait
months or years for the NLRB to resolve their
cases. And even if the employer is found to have
committed an unfair labor practice, the remedy
simply entails reinstating the fired employee with
back pay. The NLRA provides no mechanism for
punishing offending employers.
The multitude of tactics at the employer’s
disposal to prevent the union from forming or
successfully achieving gains for its members has
convinced labor that American labor laws need to
be changed to put unions on equal footing with
management. It has supported an expedited
NLRB hearing process so that workers who are
punished or discharged as a result of union activity
are enumerated or reinstated more quickly.
Violating employers would be charged with unfair
labor practices in a more timely fashion so they
are less willing to continuously violate the law.
Labor has also focused on lobbying Congress to
pass legislation imposing substantial financial
penalties on employers found to have willfully
violated the NLRA by punishing workers for
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participating in union activity, hindering the
election process, or refusing to bargain in good
faith.
Labor’s most recent legislative effort,
introduced in Congress in November 2003 and
sponsored by Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.)
and Congressman George Miller (D-Calif.), seeks
to remedy three key problems. The Employee
Free Choice Act would provide for certification of
a union if the NLRB finds that a majority of
employees in an appropriate unit has signed
authorizations designating the union as its
bargaining representative. It would ensure that if
an employer and a union are engaged in
bargaining for their first contract and are unable to
reach agreement within 90 days, either party may
refer the dispute to the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service for mediation. If the FMCS
has been unable to bring the parties to agreement
after 30 days of mediation, the dispute would be
referred to arbitration and the results of the
arbitration would be binding on the parties for two
years. Finally, it would impose stronger penalties
on employers for violating the NLRA while
employees are attempting to organize a union or
negotiate a first contract. Specifically, it would
require the NLRB to seek a federal court
injunction against an employer whenever there is
reasonable cause to believe that the employer has
discharged or discriminated against employees,
threatened to do so, or engaged in other conduct
that significantly interferes with employee rights
during an organizing or first contract drive.
Additionally, it would increase the amount an
employer is required to pay when an employee is
illegally discharged during an organizing
campaign or first contract drive to triple back pay.
Civil penalties of up to $20,000 would also be
imposed on employers found to have willfully or
repeatedly violated employees’ rights during an
organizing drive or first contract drive (AFL-CIO
2004: Employee Free Choice Act).
Despite the inequities in the law and labor’s
consistent support for proposed legislation such as
the Employee Free Choice Act, I argue that
Congress will not likely enact major labor law
reform now or in the foreseeable future. Further,
even if labor was somehow successful in passing
meaningful reforms like those proposed in the
current legislation, it is questionable whether such
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reforms, groundbreaking though they would be,
would reverse the tide of employer dominance in
labor-management relations. Why? The history
of labor law reform since 1947 provides insight on
this question.
Following the passage of the Taft-Hartley
amendments, labor strongly condemned them as
“Slave labor laws” and worked steadfastly for
their repeal. When Harry Truman won the
presidency in 1948 and the Democrats swept both
houses of Congress, labor concluded that
conditions were ripe for the extinguishment of
Taft-Hartley.
Despite the favorable political
landscape, labor’s absolute insistence on a
complete repeal of the amendments rather than the
more moderate set of reforms proposed by
President Truman proved too much for
mainstream members of Congress. As a result,
Taft-Hartley remained on the books (Hardin 1992:
46-47). Aside from the Landrum Griffin Act,
which addressed corruption in organized labor and
amended several minor provisions of Taft-Hartley,
the next major attempt to enact labor law reform
did not occur until 1978. The Labor Law Reform
Bill sought to address several of the most
egregious inequities in the law by speeding up
schedules for conducting union representation
elections and stiffening penalties for employers
who opposed union organizing by illegal means.
The law would have required employers to
compensate illegally discharged employees with
double back pay and would have barred flagrant
offenders from receiving government contracts.
Though the bill had the support of President Carter
and Democrats controlled both houses of
Congress, members of the Senate who opposed the
reforms conducted a five-week filibuster. After
six unsuccessful attempts at invoking cloture, the
legislation was recommitted to the Senate Human
Resources Committee and died (Hardin 1992: 6768).
Clearly, then, labor has been unsuccessful in
affecting meaningful labor law reform, even when
the political climate appears to lean in its favor.
These failures indicate that even Democrats, long
said to be the political ally of organized labor,
have thus far been unwilling to abandon the
capitalist ideal in favor of a more socially
progressive labor agenda. Indeed, as previously
alluded to, the Democratically controlled Congress
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of 1948 considered labor’s demands for complete
repeal of Taft-Hartley too radical to entertain.
In a 2000 Discussion Paper entitled “Toward a
New Labor Law,” the Labor Party of America
concluded that labor’s failure to enact labor law
reform “will not be reversed with more money,
better lobbying, or stronger electioneering. The
fact is that, absent very extraordinary
circumstances, business interests hold a veto
power over labor rights legislation in this country.
This is because business occupies a ‘privileged
position’ in our political system. Public officials
need cooperation from business, and they cannot
afford to take it for granted. In short, government
leaders can usually afford to stiff unions, but they
must do what it takes to obtain the cooperation of
business” (Labor Party 2000: 2).
The Labor Party’s solution to this problem is
to circumvent the political process by invoking
constitutional principles. It argues that rather than
engaging in the futile process of trying to pass
reform legislation, labor should rely on well
established democratic principles that supersede
legislation and will never be repealed, namely the
First Amendment rights of free speech and
assembly. It asserts that if these rights were
properly applied to workplace issues, the
impediments to organizing, collective bargaining,
and economic action that currently exist under
national labor legislation would be swept away by
the freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution.
Workers would be able to form an organization
without interference by employers, card checks
and election procedures would be unnecessary
because the freedom to associate would not
require them, and employees could freely strike or
picket their employers without fear of retaliation.
Further, they could urge other employers’ workers
to boycott their employer’s goods until it agreed to
settle their dispute fairly (Labor Party 2000: 2-3).
This view is shared by a number of international
labor scholars and used to criticize the American
system of labor relations.
In a paper entitled “Choice or Voice?:
Rethinking American labor policy in light of the
international human rights consensus”, Dr. Roy
Adams argues that collective bargaining can
rightly be viewed as a basic human right rather
than a privilege conferred on workers by law. He
asserts that collective bargaining is consistent with
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the notion of freedom of association, which has
been recognized as a fundamental human right by
governments and humanitarian organizations
around the world, including the International
Labour Organization, the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development, and the
World Trade Organization. In 1998, the ILO
published the Declaration of Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work, which lists five
core rights as fundamental human rights. They
are: freedom of association, effective recognition
of the right to collective bargaining, the
elimination of all forms of forced compulsory
labor, the effective abolition of child labor, the
elimination of discrimination in respect of
employment or occupation. Adams suggests that
the freedom to associate and the attendant right to
collective bargaining have been universally
recognized as human rights because of the belief
that work is a fundamental tenet of human
existence which should not be subject to
exploitation and control by those who own the
means of production. Consequently, he argues
that workers have an inalienable right to have a
voice in determining the terms and conditions of
their employment, and such a right should not be
subject to choice. Adams makes the analogy to a
nation that has chosen a democratic form of
government, asserting that once democracy is
established, “no representation as an option should
not be given legitimacy.” Similarly, he argues that
the right not to engage in collective bargaining
should not be presented as a viable option.
Clearly, an individual can make his own decision
not to participate in a democratic society or not to
engage in collective bargaining, but once society
has extended the right to engage in these activities
and affirmed the value of such rights, it should not
then encourage people not to exercise them.
Rather, societal institutions should do all in their
power to facilitate the free exercise of conferred
rights, making the process so easy and so common
that it becomes a normal function of society
(Adams 2001).
Defenders of the American system counter
that collective bargaining need not be considered a
basic human right because it is not a necessity of
human existence; thus, people should have the
freedom to choose whether to bargain collectively
or individually with their employer. Furthermore,
it is argued that freedom of association means
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having the right to choose not to associate. If
individuals are given the right to engage in
collective bargaining, they should have the
freedom to choose whether they will exercise that
right (Adams 2001).
Convention 87 of the International Labour
Organization calls for freedom of association and
protection of the right to organize. Convention 98
establishes principles with respect to the right to
organize and bargain collectively. The United
States is one of the few countries in the world that
has refused to ratify either convention, which may
not be surprising given that it is one of the few
countries that appears not to be in compliance.
Clearly, the United States would take issue with
this contention, citing the First Amendment to the
Constitution and the National Labor Relations Act
as affirmative examples of its support for the ideas
contained in the conventions. There are two
potential flaws in this line of reasoning. First, if
one agrees with Adams’ assertions regarding the
inalienable right of workers to have a voice in the
terms and conditions of their employment, the
right to bargain collectively should not be a
choice. Second, even if a worker’s right to choose
is considered a valid proposition, it can be argued
that the way in which American courts and the
National Labor Relations Board have interpreted
the NLRA leaves workers with very little real
choice. That is, because the NLRA has been
interpreted to favor employers, workers do not see
collective bargaining as a viable choice and are
thus deterred from attempting to form or join
unions. This inevitably leads them to choose
individual bargaining as the most effective way to
achieve optimal gains in the workplace. As more
and more people choose individual bargaining,
those observing trends in union participation
conclude
that
people
prefer
bargaining
individually rather than collectively and that they
are consciously exercising their freedom to choose
and associate. Having conferred on its people the
right to choose whether to bargain collectively, it
is argued that the American system of collective
bargaining is legitimate and in compliance with
world standards.
Assuming that the American system violates
international labor standards, there are several
reforms that might help close the gap. First, the
United States could implement NLRA reforms
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which have long been proposed by American labor
advocates, including interim reinstatement of
discharged workers pending NLRB proceedings,
increased workplace access for union organizers,
tougher penalties for unfair labor practices,
procedures for quicker elections and the efficient
resolution of election disputes, reversal of the
permanent-strike breaker doctrine, and first
contract arbitration. There are two basic concerns
with such reforms. First, while they would
undoubtedly be welcome changes, evidence
suggests that they might have minimal effect on
union participation rates.
Several Canadian
provinces have enacted reforms such as card check
certification, quicker election certification votes,
first contract arbitration, and stiff and rapid
sanctions against violators of Canadian labor rules.
No Canadian jurisdiction permits permanent strike
replacements, and several forbid the employer to
hire strike replacements at all. Despite these
seemingly far-reaching reforms, 8 in 10 Canadian
workers are non-union. The union participation
rate in the U.S. is 9 in 10 without such reforms
(Adams 2001).
The second problem with such NLRA
adjustments is that they would not change the
American view that workers should be able to
choose whether to engage in collective bargaining.
Without addressing the choice issue, collective
bargaining in the U.S. will continue to fall short of
international standards.
Solutions that would more thoroughly address
the choice issue are reflective of European
collective bargaining models. Congress could
create employee representative councils comprised
of delegates elected by employees in a particular
company for the purpose of co-determining, with
management, a wide range of workplace issues. In
Germany, for example, representative councils
work with management to create workplace policy
on a wide range of important issues, including
training, health and safety, the implementation of
employment legislation, and the implementation of
collective bargaining agreements negotiated on a
multi-employer basis by trade unions. Companies
may not lay off workers without council consent
(subject to arbitration), and individual discharges
may be vetoed by the council (again, subject to
arbitration) (Adams 2001).
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Other
collective
bargaining
practices
commonly found in Europe that could improve
collective bargaining in the U.S. include placing
worker representatives on corporate boards,
implementing a system of national multi-employer
bargaining, establishing statutorily wage councils
(run jointly by management and workers) for the
purpose setting wage policy, and establishing joint
health and safety committees.
Finally, a
statutorily prescribed policy of instant recognition
of collective bargaining units would have a
significant impact on the issue of choice in the
American system.
Because the introduction of these kinds of
significant changes in collective bargaining policy
would undoubtedly be resisted at first, the key to
successful implementation is to promote them in a
way that makes them an accepted part of the
collective bargaining system in America, just as
they are in Europe. To do this, labor would have
to abandon its allegiance to the American system
of labor relations and return to the socially
progressive agenda that characterized the
movement in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century. But as history has shown, labor
has suffered its most crushing defeats when it has
adopted such an agenda; therefore, a return to
progressivism is unlikely absent extraordinary
economic circumstances which open the door for
such change.
While the AFL-CIO supports the arguments
advanced by Dr. Adams and has endorsed both the
International Labor Organization’s Conventions
calling for freedom of association in the workplace
and the Declaration of Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work, its goal is merely to make
employers around the world aware of the
Declaration’s provisions and convince them to
operate their workplaces in accordance therewith.
Since there is no practical way to enforce
democratic principles in the workplace, labor’s
promotion of the Declaration and other worker
rights proposals as a response to globalization will
inevitably be inadequate to meet the needs of
American workers.
I have thus far argued that three of labor’s
primary goals (organizing of 1 million new
members annually, enacting meaningful labor law
reform, and softening the effects of globalization
through the promotion of international worker
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rights) are either unachievable absent an
extraordinary shift in economic circumstances or,
if achievable, are unlikely to reverse capital’s
dominance over workers.
However, many
scholars disagree with this assessment and have
predicted the resurgence of labor if certain
conditions are met. It is essential, therefore, to
address the validity of these counter-arguments.
First, it may be argued that the cataclysmic
economic event which I deem necessary for
change is, in fact, upon us. Indeed, economic
conditions in America today are eerily similar to
those which lead to the Great Depression. As in
the late 1920s, Americans are working an
increasing number of hours without experiencing a
corresponding rise in income. The disparity
between rich and poor is growing, with the
incomes of the wealthiest Americans occupying an
increasing percentage of the nation’s overall
wealth. And falling incomes among the middle
and lower classes have resulted in diminished
economic consumption (Wheeler 2002: 26). Why,
then, is labor finding it difficult to promote a more
socially progressive agenda and achieve greater
parity with capital? The answer may simply be
that we haven’t yet experienced the kind of
economic meltdown that distinguished the
Depression years. When three out of ten people
on the block have lost their jobs and fallen on hard
economic times, the remaining seven are not
prepared to rebel against a social and economic
system that has historically produced favorable
results. When everyone on the block is out of
work, they all have no alternative but to reexamine
the wisdom of the system that has brought them
their current circumstances.
Notwithstanding a second Great Depression,
what if labor could somehow overcome the
tremendous obstacles to enacting labor law reform
and create a system with automatic card check
certification, first contract arbitration, a ban on
permanent strike replacements, and stiffer
penalties for labor law violators? Labor strongly
argues that such changes in the law would enable
it to achieve relative parity with capital and
establish an environment conducive to workplace
democracy and worker rights.
However, as
previously noted, the enactment of many of these
policies in Canada has only slightly increased
union participation rates. This may indicate that
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greater government intervention, while certainly
helpful in balancing inequities in labormanagement relations, cannot completely nullify
the debilitating effect of strong employer
opposition.
It may be that government
intervention is only truly effective where
employers have come to accept unions as part of
the economic environment.
If these assumptions about employer
opposition are correct, what if the American
system of labor relations could be modified to
reflect those found in Europe? In Sweden, for
example,
government
has
ensured
full
employment through progressive taxation while
statutorily regulating many aspects of the labormanagement relationship. Government regulation
has provided workers with protection against
arbitrary dismissal, accidents and illness at work
(through health and safety regulations), and
declining wages (through a standardized minimum
wage, wage indexation, social security benefits,
etc.). It also plays a vital role in the collective
bargaining process by regulating the terms and
conditions through which unions and management
negotiate employment agreements. Government
involvement in the bargaining process essentially
provides workers with greater protection against
potential domination at the hands of employers.
These additional protections for workers create a
level of socio-economic equality foreign to free
market economies. In exchange, the government
allows management broad discretion to manage
their businesses as they see fit, and the private
ownership of capital is largely preserved (Gray
1998: 167).
In Germany, the market economy is
characterized by a comprehensive welfare state
and a business structure in which workers
participate in deciding how the workplace with
operate. Such a business model creates greater
equality among workers and employers than exists
in the United States. There is also industry-wide
collective bargaining over wages, benefits, and
conditions of employment, and a high degree of
job security, both of which are secured through
national legislation. When German workers lose
their jobs, the government pays them about twothirds of their incomes in unemployment benefits.
Furthermore, the value of human labor is not
measured solely in terms of productivity. Indeed,
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the slash and burn mentality so prevalent in the
American economy is subordinate to the theory
that peoples’ value as employees extends beyond
the amount they produce on a daily basis. The
chairman of the Siemens Corporation, one of the
world’s premier electronics companies, has
reportedly stated that “the hire and fire principle
does not exist here, and I never want it to.” (Gray
1998: 169).
The most obvious problem associated with
implementing these kinds of labor relations
systems is that they are socialist. As Thomas
Geoghegan notes in “Which Side Are You On”,
“the whole thrust of organized labor is….well, not
socialism” (Geoghegan 1992: 6). History shows
that labor’s previous attempts to overthrow
capitalism and replace it with a socially
progressive economic system have ended in
disaster.
Consequently, asking whether the
American system can be modified to look more
like a European-style social democracy appears
futile. However, if such a revolution were to
occur, organized labor in the United States would
most likely experience a level of strength similar
to unions in Europe, and its goals of increasing
worker participation and strengthening worker
rights would largely be realized. Again, the
primary reason for such success would be the
absence of employer opposition.
In terms of organizing new members, what if
unions could successfully offset the devastating
membership losses it has suffered in the industrial
sector by organizing the burgeoning class of white
collar and service sector workers? Would that
spur labor’s revival? White collar workers have
traditionally been more difficult to organize
because they have tended to view their interests
and abilities as being different from those of blue
collar workers. They have traditionally identified
themselves more with managers because they are
generally better educated and believe their
superior skill sets will enable them to rise to the
ranks of management or negotiate effectively with
management for what they want. That perception
has been gradually eroded by increasingly limited
opportunities for advancement among white collar
workers and the outsourcing of these jobs to
cheaper labor markets. As a result, white collar
workers are now more likely to identify with
traditional blue collar issues such as promotional
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opportunities and job security, and thus may be an
ideal organizing target. (Wheeler 2002: 73) Still,
their organizing preferences tend to differ from
those of blue collar workers. Their emphasis on
individualized rewards and promotions leads them
to form unions that: 1. bargain only for minimum
wage levels, leaving room for individual
bargaining for wages above these levels, 2.
encourage other forms of participation along with
bargaining, 3. downplay seniority and put more
emphasis on merit, 4. rarely seek finely specified
work rules, 5. minimize the strike in favor of
publicity and lobbying, and 6. are relatively
decentralized (Wheeler 2002: 58). The practices
typical of these “associational” unions are
consistent with the organizational preferences
identified by Freeman and Rogers in that they
emphasize individualism, cooperation, and
decentralization. This presents two problems for
unions. First, unions would have to completely
reinvent themselves by relinquishing control over
most aspects of the collective bargaining process.
If they agreed to abide by the above principles,
they would no longer have the power to bargain
for premium wages, seniority, or specific work
rules. They would be forced to abandon the
collective
bargaining
process
completely
whenever the members decide to bargain
individually and would be able to call a strike only
as a last resort. Given the workers’ preference for
individual action and the union’s limited ability to
act on behalf of the members, workers might well
question the wisdom of having a union at all. And
they would certainly question the wisdom of
paying union dues for so little benefit. As the
Freeman/ Rogers survey indicates, workers in this
situation might decide that they can just as
effectively engage in occasional collective action
without the formality of a union.
The second potential problem with organizing
private sector professional employees on a large
scale is that it would most likely require changes
to the NLRA’s rules regarding subjects of
bargaining. Section 9(a) of the Act provides that
representatives designated or selected by the
employees in an appropriate bargaining unit shall
be the exclusive representative “for the purpose of
collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay,
wages, hours, or other conditions of employment.”
The NLRB and the Supreme Court have
subsequently used this language to establish a
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distinction between mandatory and permissive
subjects of bargaining (Hardin 1992: 595). It is
argued that the failure of the NLRA to require
bargaining on permissive subjects such as the
basic policies of work organization makes it illsuited to collective bargaining for professional
employees because it is those subjects with which
professional employees are most concerned.
Additionally, the Act’s rules establishing the union
as the exclusive representative of all employees
runs counter to the preference of many workers to
bargain individually and create informal collective
bargaining arrangements as necessary (Wheeler
2002: 74).
A similar argument is made with regard to
“geographical/occupational unionism“, which
involves organizing workers along occupational
lines regardless of their geographic location.
While such an organizational tactic allows unions
to expand the scope of their organizing campaign
and attract new members, the NLRA limits
“network-based” or “multiemployer” bargaining.
For this to be a viable organizing alternative, the
Act would have to be changed to permit
employees of different employers to bargain
jointly with those employers (Wheeler 2002: 52).
Given the difficulties labor has encountered trying
to amend the NLRA, such change is unlikely.
CONCLUSION
“Labor thinks of itself, consciously, as being
as American as apple pie. But it is not. Go to any
union hall, any union rally, and listen to the
speeches. It took me years to hear it, but there is a
silence, a deafening silence, on the subject of
individualism. No one is against it, but it never
comes up. Individualism is for scabs. This
country is set up for scabs. Crossing a picket line,
making your own deal. America is the land of
opportunity. The subversive thing about labor is
not the strike, but the idea of solidarity.”
(Geoghegan 1992: 5). Thomas Geoghegan thus
encapsulates the premise of this paper. I have
argued that individualism will always prevail over
the social progressivism embodied by the
American labor movement. The latter is rooted in
the idea that “an injury to one is an injury to all”,
but in America, it is simply more appealing to
believe that each of us has the ability to get what
we want on our own and that, once we get it, we
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shouldn’t have to share it with anyone. The
history of the labor movement shows that any
attempt to replace capitalism with social
democracy will be met with defeat, even when the
very foundations on which capitalism is based
have collapsed. Consequently, the most viable
solution to the problem of employer domination
may be a return to the idea of worker cooperatives
advanced by the Knights of Labor. If workers are
able to assume ownership of the means of
production, they are no longer in opposition to
management because they are management.
However, in a system where some are employers
and others are employees, the best labor can do is
to continue advocating for the right of workers to
participate in the decisions that affect their lives at
work and to promote a more equitable society. In
ordinary economic times, it is not likely to fully
achieve these goals by organizing new members or
electing pro-labor politicians or supporting
fundamental workplace rights abroad, although it
must try. In extraordinarily hard economic times,
it must take advantage of its elevated position in
society to establish basic workplace rights that
cannot be taken away, even when the economy
recovers and labor is once again relegated to
underdog status. The minimum wage, the eight
hour day, unemployment insurance, and
workplace health and safety laws are proof that
labor has the ability, under certain circumstances,
to strengthen workers’ rights. As Geoghegan
notes, “A union movement in America will always
be a scandal. But, at the very least, we want to be
cut in on the deal” (Geoghegan 1992: 6). If labor
cannot successfully change the system, it must do
what it can to be “cut in on the deal.”
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